This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international con ‡ict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international con ‡icts. Second, the number of regional con ‡icts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend -i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -is limited by the process of country breakup.
Introduction
The end of the cold war has been accompanied by a sweeping process of democratization, creation of new countries and political separatism. However, even though the probability of a confrontation between the two superpowers of the cold war era is greatly diminished, the number of localized con ‡icts has not decreased. Several observers have in fact argued that one should expect more regional con ‡icts after the end of the cold war. 1 This paper provides a model that is consistent with both these observations. First, it implies an increase in the number of countries as a consequence of a reduction in the probability of international con ‡ict. Second, it argues that a reduction in the probability of con ‡ict among a few large countries, by increasing, in equilibrium, the number of smaller countries, may increase the number of con ‡icts between the more numerous, smaller independent political units. A related observation concerns the extent of the "peace dividend," i.e., the reduction in military spending following the end of the cold war. 2 Our model suggests that the worldwide "peace dividend" may be smaller than one might expect. The reason is that the per capita costs of defense may increase in smaller countries than have to deal with potentially more numerous regional con ‡icts. We analyze both the case of con ‡icts between democratic governments where decisions are taken by voting and between dictators that maximize their rents. This paper joins two strands of the analytical literature. One is the economic literature on the size of countries, as in Friedman (1977) , Bolton and Roland (1997) and Casella and Feinstein (2002) . The present paper, in particular, builds upon Spolaore (1997, 2003) where the equilibrium number 1 Hobsbawn (1994) cites the 1991 Gulf War as an example. 2 For instance, Clemens, Gupta and Schi¤ (1997) cite WEO data according to which a third of 130 countries maintained or increased their military spending as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 1995. They also calculate that the ten developing countries with the largest increases in defense spending between 1985 and 1992 had an average increase of 2.7 percentage points of GDP.
of countries is derived as emerging from a trade-o¤: the bene…ts of economics of scale in the production of nonrival public goods against the costs of heterogeneity in the population. Here we explicitely consider the bene…t of size that arises from the possibility of international con ‡icts and the costs of defense. In Alesina and Spolaore (2004) we discuss the relationship between con ‡ict and political breakup in a two-bloc word. While in that paper we can be more general about the technology of con ‡icts and wars, in the present paper we simplify in that dimension. On the other hand, in this paper we do not restrict our analysis to the formation and breakup of two blocs, but we can solve for a generic number of political units (countries) as part of a general politico-economic equilibrium.
Also in the present paper we explicitly model heterogeneity among individuals as stemming from di¤erent preferences over types of government, and we discuss both the case of democracies and of dictatorships.
The second line of research is the literature on con ‡ict resolution and arms races surveyed by Sandler and Hartley (1995) , and by various contributions in Hartley and Sandler (1995) . Classic references are Schelling (1960) , Boulding (1962), Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and Tullock (1974) . 3 Findlay (1996) discusses the stability of empires in a word where armed con ‡ict is explicitly modeled. 4 In particular, our formalization of the technology of con ‡ict resolution follows Tullock (1980) and Hirshleifer (1989 Hirshleifer ( , 1995 .
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model as applied to democracies. Section 3 illustrates the domestic equilibrium on the choice of defense and non-defense spending. Section 4 characterizes a voting equilibrium in which the number and size of countries is endogenously determined. Section 5 discusses issues of stability, and speci…cally, unilateral secessions. Section 6 considers the case in which public spending (including 3 For recent formal contributions within the …eld of international relations see Powell (1999) . 4 The relationship between domestic politics and international con ‡ict is studied by Gar…nkel (1994) and Hess and Orphanides (1995; . A related literature formally studies the role and consequences of con ‡ict and insurrections for the distribution of property rights.
In particular, see Grossman (1991) and Grossman and Kim (1995) .
defense), taxation and borders are not chosen by voters but by rent-seeking governments (Leviathans). Section 7 extends the model to allow for a more general matching technology, and discusses other possible extensions of the basic framework. The last section concludes.
The Basic Model
The world is modeled as a segment of length normalized to 1. The world population has mass 1 and is uniformly distributed on the segment [0; 1]. 5 A country is de…ned by two borders and a non-rival public good, which we label the 'government.' Each individual can only use one public good, i.e., one government, and individual utility is decreasing in the distance from the government of the country to which the individual belongs. The distance of individual i from his government is denoted l i . We assume that this distance captures both a geographical and a preference dimension. That is, being "far" from the government implies being distant both in geographical location and in preferences:
if two individuals live far from each other, they are also distant in preferences.
Hence, the location of a government captures both a position on an ideological dimension and on a geographical line. As discussed in more detail in Alesina and Spolaore (1997), this assumption ensures that countries are geographically
connected. An alternative assumption would be to retain only the preference interpretation of distance and then impose costs on non-geographically connected countries. For the purpose of this paper the "preference" interpretation of distance is not necessary, although it makes the model richer.
Individual utility is given by
where z i is the total income available to individual i; t i are his taxes, l i is the distance of individual i from his government, and g is a positive parameter.
Thus, individual utility is linear in private consumption (z i ¡ t i ) and linear in 5 In Section 7 we will discuss extensions of these simplifying spatial assumptions.
the distance from the public good. The utility deriving from the public good is highest for l i = 0:
The cost of a government is K , irrespectively of the size of the country.
This speci…cation captures in the simplest possible way the bene…t of "size" of a country. 6 In fact, with a …xed cost of government the average per capita cost of …nancing is decreasing with the size of the country. In reality, the bene…ts of country size derive from several …xed costs, including creating and maintaining a monetary system, a bureaucracy, a tax collection system. In addition, in a world of less that perfect free trade, the size of markets is a¤ected by the size of political jurisdictions. In any model with increasing returns in the size of the market economy, and some barriers to international trade, income is increasing in the size of the country. 7 Also, a large country can provide insurance to its regions, needed because of the occurrence of regional idiosyncratic shocks. 8 Thus, in equilibrium the size of countries emerges from a trade-o¤. Large countries can take advantage of the bene…ts of size, but are less homogeneous since a larger population has preferences that are more diverse. As the size of a country increases, the per capita cost of government decreases, but the average distance from the government increases.
We now consider the role of international con ‡ict and defense spending.
Individual resources z i are divided into two components.
y is individual income (equal for everybody), which is safe from the consequences of con ‡ict; e i is the expected amount of resources of individual i after a (possible) international con ‡ict is resolved. 6 A more general speci…cation would be to impose K = ® +¯s where s is the size of the country. As long as ® > 0 our results would be qualitatively unchanged. See Alesina, Baqir Con ‡ict is modeled as follows. Individuals are randomly matched pair-wise.
When a pair (i; j) meets, the two individuals generate a pool of resources equal to 2e which has to be divided. There are two possible states: con ‡ict (c) and no con ‡ict (nc). In a state of nc resources are distributed peacefully and equally:
We assume that:
A1: If two individuals who belong to the same country meet, they are always in a state of no con ‡ict.
If two individuals, i and j, who do not belong to the same country meet, they can either be in con ‡ict or in no con ‡ict, in which case (3) applies. Con ‡ict occurs with probability p ij . The following assumptions generates a role for 'defense spending':
A2: If con ‡ict occurs, the share of individual i depends on the defense spending of his country, relative to defense spending of the country of individual j:
where
is the defense spending in the country of individual i (j) and
Assumption A1 rules out domestic con ‡ict. In fact we could assume an additional cost for a country for internal "law and order" and con ‡ict resolution (courts, legal system, etc.). If this costs were increasing in the size of the country, it would provide an additional argument for the costs of country size, in addition to the "average distance" argument emphasized above. If these costs were linear, our results would be completely una¤ected. If these costs were decreasing in the size of countries (i.e., economies of scale in law and order) they would provide an additional bene…t for large countries. The second assumption borrows from the literature on con ‡ict resolution, and in particular from Tullock (1980) and Hirshleifer (1989; 1995) . The idea is that the bene…ts for the citizens of a certain country in case of international con ‡ict are increasing in the military strength of the country relative to the opponent. 9 The resolution of con ‡ict in our model should not necessarily be interpreted as a "war." The key point is the existence of a link between individuals' payo¤s and the relative strength of their respective governments. Our speci…cation is consistent with con ‡ict resolution taking the form of violent confrontations, but can also be interpreted quite generally as military "muscle ‡exing" or the weight in international exchanges and bargaining tables arising from a country's relative strength. 10 Also the sources of potential con ‡ict between individuals and groups belonging to di¤erent jurisdictions are modelled quite generally. They may stem from a trade relationship, or from con ‡icting interests on natural resources and/or other economic and noneconomic issues. 11 For tractability, we make two simplifying assumptions:
Assumption A3 is an innocuous functional speci…cation that simpli…es algebra without loss of generality. By contrast, assumption A4 introduces a drastic simpli…cation, since it implies that all individuals have the same probability of being matched. Hence, it implies that the probability of a match is independent of the distance between the pair. 12 This assumption is made for analytical convenience but its realism might be questioned in a world with transportation 9 We are assuming that spending on defense translates into military strength. Thus, we are abstracting from di¤erent 'productives' of defense spending in di¤erent countries. 1 0 For a game-theoretical analysis of con ‡ict resolution through war or peaceful bargaining in a di¤erent analytical setting see . 1 1 For a model of trade, con ‡ict and political borders see Spolaore (2002) . 1 2 This assumption is analogous to the assumption of "panmictic matching" which is standard in the formal biological literature.
costs or other obstacles to international exchanges. Assumption A4 will be relaxed in Section 7, where we present a more general setting in which matching probabilities are an explicit function of distance. Finally, the model could also be extended to incorporate explicit direct costs of …ghting, in addition to the costs of defense spending, without any qualitative change in the results.
Suppose that the world is divided in N countries, indexed by h, of size s h ; h = 1; :::N . Then, the value of e i is given by:
The …rst term in (7) represents the payo¤ of no con ‡ict 
Equation (8) indicates that the total tax revenues have to equal the total of non defense spending (K ) and defense spending (d h ).
Voting on Government and Defense
In this section we will consider equilibrium outcomes when individuals vote by majority rule on the location (type) of government and on the size of defense.
We make the following two assumptions:
A5 Voting on the location of the government and the size of defense occurs after the country borders have been established. This is natural since it implies that policy decisions on the type of government and the amount of defense spending can be taken only after a country is created.
A6
In each country, taxes are the same for everyone.
Two observations emerge immediately from the structure of the model:
i) For given borders, every citizen has the same preferences on the optimal amount of defense; and
ii) The government is located in the middle of the country.
The …rst observation derives from the fact, embodied in (7), that every individual has the same probability of meeting a foreigner and all individual payo¤s depend identically on the country's aggregate level of defense. Second, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) derived this assumption as a result of a realistic voting process on the distribution of the tax burden. With the same tax for everyone, individuals close to the government are better o¤ than those far from it. If taxes were decided by majority vote, those individuals who are 1 3 This result would not hold if, for instance, individuals close to the borders had a higher change of engaging in con ‡icts with foreigners. In the latter case, border individuals would prefer a higher spending on defense. In Section 6 we will discuss a relaxation of our matching assumption such that individuals closer to the borders might in fact face a higher probability of non-peaceful con ‡ict with foreigners. 1 4 We do not explore here a connection with the literature on revelation mechanisms.
far from the government would favor tax compensation schemes in their favor.
Such schemes might also enforce larger countries, by keeping border individuals "in," with tax advantages. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) consider linear taxation schemes, where the tax rate is a linear function of the distance from the government. They show that, under some weak assumptions, if voting on taxes occurs after country borders are decided (exactly as assumption A5 requires), then the voting equilibrium implies the same tax for everyone and the government located in the middle. The intuition is that for given borders, …fty percent of the voters (those with a distance from the government above average) would like to maximize compensations. The other half would want to minimize them. The tie is broken if one assumes even in…nitesimal implementation costs of these transfer schemes. In summary, under realistic assumptions on the order of voting, a majority would favor equal taxes. Thus, A6 could be derived as a result, rather than imposed as an assumption. Since our focus here is not on compensation schemes, we simply impose A6 from the start. 15 With taxes equal for every citizen the budget constraint for country h of size
Using (1), (7), and (9) we can derive the following …rst order condition which determines the desired amount of defense by each individual of country h
Equation (10) shows that the marginal costs of an extra unit of defense spending (equal to 1=s h from (9)) must equal the marginal bene…ts, in terms of a higher 'prize' in case of con ‡icts, which is the second term in (10), obtained from (7).
The Equilibrium Number of Countries
We now characterize an equilibrium number of countries when not only type of government, taxation and public spending but also borders are determined democratically. Unfortunately the assumption that political borders are determined via majority voting is unlikely to have held in actual societies through most of history, and is still far from re ‡ecting actual border formation -although one owuld hope that it is a better approximation today than it would have been in the past. We derive this equilibrium as a useful benchmark to provide insights on the democratic formation and redrawing of borders. 16 The voting equilibrium can then be pro…tably compared with the perhaps realistic equilibrium solution developed in Section 5, in which taxation, public spending, defense and borders are the outcomes of decisions taken by rent-maximizing "Leviathans."
The …rst requirement which we impose on an equilibrium con…guration of borders is the following: The proof is immediate, remembering that everyone pays the same tax.
Proposition 1 does not imply that the only type of equilibria which satis…es 1 6 By focusing on democratic decisions over borders, we are assuming that con ‡ict is not about borders, but about economic and/or noneconomic issues that arise between groups belonging to di¤erent jurisdictions after borders have been determined. For a di¤erent model in which con ‡ict is over territory see .
Requirement 1 has countries of equal size. We return on this point in Section 5 in the context of our discussion of stability. Note, however, that given our assumption of uniform distribution of individuals, equilibria with equally-sized countries are the natural candidates. In turn, if all the countries have equal size, the natural candidates for an equilibrium is the symmetric one, with each country spending the same amount on defense. Using (10), the symmetric equilibrium with N countries of equal size s (so that N = 1=s) implies that
Several observations are in order. First, the equilibrium amount of defense is increasing in the probability of con ‡ict. Not surprisingly, it is also increasing in the amount of the payo¤ from con ‡ict e. Second, defense spending is zero when there is only one country in the world, since, by de…nition, there is no con ‡ict. Third, defense pro capita, which is
is decreasing with country size. Larger countries have, in equilibrium, a lower per capita defense bill. Fourth, since defense is, from the point of view of global e¢ciency, pure waste, individual utility would be maximized if p = 0 and
¤ for every country using (7) e i = e for every i, exactly as in the case of p = 0: When p > 0, however, the "price" of the payo¤ e is the per capita cost of defense given in (12) . Obviously, we have a suboptimal Nash equilibrium on defense spending.
Empirically, the relationship between country size and defense per capita is in ‡uenced by two critical factors which our model does not capture: the existence of military alliances, and the fact that smaller members of an alliance can free ride on the defense capabilities of the larger member(s). 17 Both considerations are very important, and we do not mean to downplay them. However, we see our model as a stepping stone upon which to build these additional realistic features.
We now consider border redrawing by majority rule. We allow the existing countries to eliminate a country or create a new country if the border change is approved by majority rule in each of the countries whose borders are a¤ected by the change. We restrict voting only on proposals of border redrawing which satisfy Requirement 1.
Requirement 2. Given a con…guration of countries that satis…es Requirement 1, in at least one country a majority should oppose any proposal to redraw borders so that a new country is created or eliminated. Only proposals that satisfy Requirement 1 are admissible.
In other words, this requirement implies that in an equilibrium at least one country would veto any border rearrangement. Thus, we are trying to capture situations like referenda on the choice of joining politico-economic unions (like the European Union), or post-war international conferences to settle border disputes, or, more generally, border rearrangements which are the result of some form of international agreement rather than the result of unilateral secessions, which we study in the next section.
Proposition 2.
The number of equally-sized countries which satis…es Requirement 2 is given by the integer that is closest to r g ¡ pe 2K
Proof in Appendix.
For the sake of simplicity in exposition, from now we will abstract from the integer condition and assume that
is the equilibrium number of countries.
Corollary: The equilibrium number of countries is decreasing with the probability of con ‡ict p.
This is one of the critical results of the paper: it implies that a sharp decrease in the probability of con ‡ict would result in the break-up of countries. Two forces underlie this inverse relationship between p and
an individual would like to belong to a larger country in order to reduce the probability of "being matched" with foreigners. Second, since defense spending increases in p and defense per capita is decreasing in larger countries, the bene…ts of size increase. If we view the end of the cold war as a large drop in p, the model predicts that the creation of new countries should go hand in hand with the end of the cold war.
One could expect that a large fall in the probability of con ‡ict p (e.g., the "end of the cold war"), should bring about a more peaceful world and a "peace dividend," namely a reduction in the per capita cost of defense. However, the emergence of several local con ‡icts cast doubt on the …rst implication, and the "peace divident" has been slow in materializing. Our model is consistent with both these rather sad observations.
Let's begin with the amount of world con ‡ict. De…ne the mass of observable con ‡ict M. We have that
where » s(p) is the equilibrium size of countries. Thus, from Proposition 2
The mass of international con ‡icts is increasing in p if and only if:
Proof: From (14) dM(p) dp
The intuition of Proposition 3 is that a reduction in p has two e¤ects. For a given size of countries, it reduces the mass of international con ‡ict. This direct e¤ect is larger the smaller is s, namely the larger the "mass" of international "matches," relative to domestic "matches." The second, and indirect e¤ect, is that a reduction in p reduces the size of countries, thus it increases the mass of international interactions that can, potentially, lead to con ‡ict. As equation (16) Therefore, starting from a world with a few large countries, a reduction in p which leads to the formation of many new countries may actually increase the mass of observed con ‡icts.
A similar intuition underlies the e¤ect of a reduction of p on defense spending per capita. From (12) it follows that
ds dp
The …rst term is the direct positive e¤ect of a change in p on defense per capita:
a lower p leads to lower defense. The second term, with the opposite sign, is the indirect e¤ect due to the consequences of a change in p on the size of countries.
Equation (18) leads to the following:
A reduction in p determines a reduction of defense per capita if and only if
Thus, a reduction of p may actually lead to an increase in defense spending per capita because countries become smaller. More generally, even when (19) holds, so that lower p means lower defense, the model emphasizes a channel (through the size of countries) which reduces the e¤ect of p on d ¤ =s.
Stability
In this section, we consider the issue of stability of the equilibrium both to small perturbations and to unilateral secessions. We begin perturbations in which one border is moved slightly, so that a small mass of population changes country. ii) the defense spending of countries 1 and 2; and iii) the defense spending of all the other (N ¡ 2) countries. 1 8 Intuitively, the third adjustment is "second order," particularly for N large.
In fact, looking at the …rst order condition (equation (10) (20) 1 8 Note that the location-type of government in these (n ¡ 2) countries does not change, because their borders do not change.
Proof in Appendix.
Thus, the minimum stable size is (weakly) increasing in p. If p is high, small countries are not stable, in the sense that if a perturbation makes one country larger, the citizens of the neighboring smaller countries would want to join the bigger country, because defense is too expensive in the smaller country.
Thus, the implication of Proposition 5 is that, even leaving aside Requirement 2, the minimum stable size of countries (weakly) increases in p: with a higher probability of con ‡ict, the minimum stable size of countries is larger. 1 9 We can now extend our analysis of Requirement 2 to the case where we explicitly take into account the issue of "-stability. Namely we modify Requirement 2 as follows:
Given a con…guration of countries that satis…es Requirement 3, in at least one country a majority should oppose any proposal to redraw borders so that a new country is created or eliminated. Only proposals which satisfy Requirement 1 and 3 are admissible.
Numerical simulations described in Appendix show the following
Results
a) The maximum number of equally-sized countries that satis…es Requirement 3 is decreasing in p;
b) The number of equally-sized countries N that satis…es Requirement 2' is the integer closes to r g ¡ pe 2K (or, for small values of pe, the largest integer smaller than
For large values of
, we can ignore the integer condition and approximate the number of countries that satis…es Requirement 2' by
This number, therefore, not only approximates the equilibrium number of countries that satis…es Requirements 1 and 2, but also the stable number of countries that satis…es Requirements 3 and 2'. 1 9 Of course, it is possible that small increases in p leave the equilibrium size unchanged.
We now turn to the issue of stability to unilateral secessions. A unilateral secession occurs when a (connected) set of individuals belonging to an existing country unilaterally forms a new country.
De…nition: A country of size s is secession free, if no group of citizens would want to unilaterally break away and form a new country.
First of all, note that if a secession occurs, three adjustments have to occur:
i) the location of government and defense spending of the new country;
ii) the location of government and the defense spending of the country which has been split, and
iii) the defense spending of all the other countries not a¤ected by the secession.
While for the case of the "-stability the third adjustment was "second order,"
this is not the case for (potentially large) unilateral secessions. Thus, we cannot derive results analogous to Proposition 5.
Note that the individuals with the highest incentives to break away are those located far away from the government near the borders of the original country.
In fact, for given country size, and given size of a secession, those who gain the most are those who were far from the original government and are much closer to the government of the new country. Clearly, the possibility of secession imposes an upper limit on country size. If a country is too large, a fraction of its citizens at the border would break away because they are so far from the government that they are willing to bear the costs of a higher defense bill and total tax per capita, and lower total defense in a con ‡ictual world.
The …rst question which we ask is whether the con…guration of A second interesting question is the following. Leaving aside Requirement 2, what is the relationship between p and the minimum size which is secession free? By numerical simulations, described in Appendix we obtain the following:
Result: The maximum size that is secession free is increasing in p.
In other words, when the probability of a con ‡ict increases, larger countries that would not have been secession-free for a smaller p become secession free.
Conversely, a sharp drop in p would induce certain regions to secede, which would not have seceded with a higher p. Therefore, even leaving aside the equilibrium number of countries » N obtained applying Requirement 2, this result on secessions establishes that one should observe secessions when, for whatever reason, the probability of con ‡ict decreases.
This observation is quite important because it underlies the generality of the direct relationship between country size and probability of international con ‡ict. In fact, this relationship emerges simply as a result of the secessionfree requirement, regardless of any other requirement which (like Requirement 2) identi…es a speci…c equilibrium number of countries.
Con ‡ict in a World of Leviathans
In reality political borders are rarely determined democratically. Moreover, for most of history decisions over defense spending, types of governments, taxation, wars and con ‡ict have not been taken by democratic "median voters" but by all sorts of nondemocratic rulers (kings, emperors, dictators, etc.). In this section we derive a model of con ‡ict and size of countries in a world of rent-seeking "Leviathans" that generalize our previous results.
As before, individuals are uniformly distributed over the segment [0,1], and have utility equal to (1). As above, we assume that each individual pays the same tax t. That is, Leviathans are unable to tax individuals as a function of their preferences over the type of government. 20 Therefore, a Leviathan ruling a country of size sh and spending dh in defense obtains net rents equal to
We assume that each Leviathan must guarantee at least a utility level of u 0 to a fraction ± of his citizens. The parameter ± captures the idea that no ruler can keep power without the support of at least a fraction of its subjects.
A dictatorial ruler would need a low ± to maintain power. In other words, ± measures the degree to which subjects' preferences constarin the ruler's decsiions (i.e., the degree of "democratic accountability" of the Leviathan). Without loss of generality, we will assume that a Leviathan faced with a ± > 0 will locate the governemnt in the middle of the country. 21 Therefore, a Leviathan who rules a country of size s h faces the following constraint
where z i is income per capita in country h. This means that the utility of an individual at a distance equal to ±s h 2 from the government must be at least as high as u 0 . Clearly, if the above constraint is satis…ed, at least ±s h individuals have a utility larger or equal to u 0 , and the Leviathan's constraint is satis…ed.
Clearly the Leviathan will not choose to increase welfare of its citizens above the minimum level that satis…es the constraint (22) . Any additional welfare would come at the expense of the Leviathan's rents. Thus equation (22) will hold with equality. Substituting this equation holding with equality into (21) one obtains:
2 0 An interesting topic, which we do not develop here, is whether Leviathans would use compensation schemes, if available. 2 1 Formally, if b denotes the location of the "Eastern border," the Leviathan will maximize his rents by locating the government in the interval [b+ ±s h =2 , b+ s h ¡ ±s h =2], which always includes the middle point b +s h =2 for 0 · ± · 1; and incudes only the middle point for ± = 1:
As before, we assume that each government chooses defense spending after political borders have been formed, and taking other countries' defense spending as given. 2 2 However now, unlike in the previous model, defense is not chosen by voters but by Leviathans in order to maxximize their net rents. Nontheless, for given borders Leviathans will choose the same level of defense spending that would be chosen through direct democracy. In fact, since z i = y + e i where e i is given by equation (7), it is immediate to check that the …rst-order condition for the maximization of (23) given (7) is identical to (10) . In particular, in a symmetric worrld in which all countries have equal size s; defense in each country is given as follows
But what is the quilibrium number and size of countries in a world of Leviathans?
In what follows we will assume that borders are determined in order to maximize governments' joint net revenues. In this respect we follow Friedman (1977) In a world of Leviathans in which all countries have equal size (a necessary condition for joint maximization) total rents are
Hence, the equilibrium size is 23 2 2 Therefore we maintain the assumption that con ‡ict is not directly over borders. 2 3 Again, we abstract from the fact that N ± = 1=s ± must be a positive integer.
and the number of countries is
Note that as above the higher the probability of con ‡ict (p) the larger the size of countries with Leviathans, as in the case of democracies. Also the higher ± (more "democratic" Leviathans) means smaller countries. It is important to notice that for ± = 1 (maximum "democratic" accountability) the Leviathan solution coincides with the democratic equilibrium in which borders themselves are determined via majority voting. The fact that the same solution is obtained in two very di¤erent politico-economic frameworks highlights the robustness of our previous results.
As already noticed, the qualitative e¤ects of p on the size of nations is the same as in the democratic model: all other things being equal, more con ‡ict leads to larger countries. But how do di¤erent degrees of "democratization" (i.e., di¤erent ± 0 s) a¤ect the impact of p on the size of countries? In fact we have that
which means that, at higher levels of con ‡ict, democratization has small e¤ects on the size of countries and vice versa. In other words, in a world of high con ‡ict democratization is "less important" in reducing the size of countries, and in a world of more widespread democracy, con ‡ict is less important in determining the size of countries.
An interesting extension would make p a decreasing function of ±. This would capture rudimentarily the concept of "democratic peace." The larger is ± the closer a Leviathan is to a democracy. In this case an increase in ± (democratization) would reduce the size of countries for two reasons: a direct e¤ect (democratization) and an indirect e¤ect through a reduction of the probability of wars, p.
Other Extensions
Our basic model is highly stylized and simpli…ed in many dimensions. In the previous section we have seen how our results -which we derived in a democratic framework -can be extended to allow for decisions by nondemocratic (or imperfectly democratic) Leviathans. In this section we will discuss two other extensions. First, we will relax the assumption that the probability of a match between individuals is not a function of their relative distance. In particular, we will present a simple extension in which the importance of distance is captured by one parameter (°) and show how our results are robust to such extension. In the last part of this section we will brie ‡y discuss the implications of relaxing another simplifying assumption, that is, uniform distribution of individuals on the geographical/preference space. In our previous analysis we showed how the Leviathan solution for ± = 1 coincides with the voting equilibrium. In this section, to simplify algebra and notation, we will consider the Leviathan case with maximum democracy (± = 1). 25 The analysis can be easily extended to the general case 0 · ± · 1.
Distance-dependent Matching

6
When matching is a function of distance, our main results can now be summarized as follows. 27 Equilibrium defense per capita is now given by
which reduces to our previous result (12) for°= 1: The intuition for the above equations (29a)-(29b) is straightforward: as the probability of having potential con ‡icts with distant individuals increase (higher°), so does defense per capita.
As shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium size of countries is now given as
2 4 To avoid excessive algebraical complications associated with asymmetries between the middle and the tails of the space distribution when relative distance matters, we will also assume that the interval [0,1] is mapped -both geographically and ideologically -on a circle of unit perimeter. In other words, without loss of generality, we will consider a circular version of our spatial model, therefore maintaining symmetry across individuals. For more details see Appendix. 2 5 In our previous analysis we showed how the Leviathan solution for ± = 1 coincided with the voting equilibrium. 2 6 The details of the derivation are available upon request. 2 7 Derivations are in the Appendix.
s°=°2
for 2
When°is low, distance is a major obstacle to interactions: people tend to meet mostly people within their own jurisdictions, and con ‡ict plays no role in the determination of the size of countries. By contrast, at higher levels of°, international con ‡ict becomes more important, and directly a¤ects the number and size of countries. Hence, the size of countries is (weakly) increasing in p -and strictly increasing for high levels of°-qualifying and con…rming our previous results: Moreover, since a higher°means that con ‡ict and defense are more important, the number of countries is also (weakly) increasing in°: Of course, the functional form of the relationship between the number of countries and the "importance of distance" (inversely related to°) depends on the speci…cation we have chosen in order to obtain simple, closed-form solutions. But the two key messages of thsi extension sem to be pretty general and robsut: a) one should expect a positive relationship between p and defense -this relationship is liekly to be stronger when distance is less important (high°in our speci…cation) and b) one should also expect a positive relationship between size of countries and likelihood of interactions with (geographically and ideologically) distant individuals.
Nonuniform Distributions
The assumption of a uniform distribution of individuals can also be relaxed, but at the price of major algebraical complications. A key advantage of maintaining the uniform-distribution assumption is that it allows the derivation of simple closed-form solutions for the equilibrium number and size of countries.
In a world where countries are symmetric and all have equal size, comparative statics is highly simpli…ed: one can talk about the size of countries, rather than having to trace complex changes in the size distribution of countries. By contrast, nonuniform distributions usually imply that di¤erent countries will have di¤erent sizes, di¤erent levels of aggregate defense and/or defense per capita, etc. Hence obtaining closed-formed solutions will be pretty elusive, and one will have to resort to analytical simulations in order to obtain comparative statics results. However, the main message of our paper (a positive relationship between probability of con ‡ict and size of countries, and its "general equilibrium" implications) will tend to carry on to more general settings. In what follows we will illustrate this point by brie ‡y discussing an example of nonuniform distribution.
Assume that individuals are not distributed uniformly on the interval [0,1].
Without much loss of generality, assume that the density function f (x) is increasing over [0, 1] . In particular, assume
which implies a cumulative dstribution function
Hence, the world population, as before, has mass 1, but half of it is (nonuniformly) located between 0 and 
and
Equations ( 
Hence, the smaller country will have a larger defense per capita, and the larger country will have smaller defense per capita, con…rming the existence of economies of scale in defense for this asymmetric case. 28 The equilibrium condition (32) extend to the case with con ‡ict as follows:
Analogous conditions can be obtained for N = 3; 4, etc.
By the same token, the analysis can be extended to derive the equilibrium conditions that would satisfy requirement 2. Of course, in general one cannot be obtained in this extended setting, but analytical simulations could be used to compare di¤erent con…gurations of borders. All other things being equal, voters would prefer smaller countries at lower levels of p. 29 This example illustrate how the key insights from the analysis carry on to more general distributions of individuals over the geographical/idelogical space. Analogously, the analysis could be extended to deal with the case of Leviathans and/or with the case of distance-dependent matchings.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a model consistent with three observations. First, seces- geographically. In reality, the existence of ethnic minorities is a critical determinant of both country formation and secessions and of regional con ‡icts.
More generally, focusing on continuous distributions of individual characteristics allows us to study some important and robust relationships between con ‡ict, defense and country size with the minimum amount of notational and analytical complexity. However, additional insights can probably be obtained by extending and modifying the basic framework in order to allow for asymmetries and discontinuities. These extensions are left for future research.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let l ih fN g denote the distance of individual I, belonging to country h, from his country's government when the world is divided in N countries of equal size s = 1=N , and let t ih fN g denote the taxes paid by i. Each individual i in country h will prefer N to N + 1 countries if and only if:
That is:
Since:
we have that, for every individual i in each country h
Denote with l m h fN g¡l mn 0 fN +1g the median distance change in country h.
It can be shown 3 0 that the median distance change is the same in all countries, and equal to:
Hence, N is always preferred to N + 1 in all countries if and only if
which is satis…ed if and only if:
Analogously, each individual i is country h will prefer N to N ¡ 1 if and only if:
It is immediate to verify that, for every i in each country h, we have:
N will satisfy requirement 2 only if there exists at least one country h in which:
It can be shown 31 that, for any N , the maximum median distance change l m ih 0 fN ¡ 1g ¡ l m h fN g is given by:
Therefore, there exists no country h in which the median voter prefers N ¡ 1 to N if and only if:
which is satis…ed if and only if: (s+)
Di¤erentiate both sides with respect to ", noting that the right hand size of (A.16) and (A.17) are a constant. Then evaluate the two expressions at " = 0,
Solving, one obtains: for any p > 0: If p = 0 the condition for stability can be written as follows:
Suppose now thatŝ(p) <ŝ ( A similar argument based on contradiction establishes thatŝ(p 0 )¸ŝ(p); thus it follows that the functionŝ(p) is weakly increasing in p.
Q.E.D.
Numerical simulations "¡Stability.
Consider N countries of equal size s = 1=N: Suppose that a small perturbation takes place at the border between country 1 and country 2, so that s Let N ¤ denote the maximum number of equally-sized countries that satis…es Requirement 3, i.e., that is stable (or, more speci…cally, "¡stable). Denote 3 2 The details of all simulations described in this Appendix are avialble from the authors upon request.
with N 0 the largest integer smaller than q g ¡p e 2K
, and with N 00 the integer that is closest to q g ¡pe
2K
. In all our simulations we have 1) N ¤ is decreasing in pe.
2) N 0 is always "-stable; N 00 is "-stable for values of pe larger than the critical Hence, if N 00 is "-stable, the number N which satis…es Requirement 2' is equal to N ¤ . Otherwise, it is equal to N 0 , which is always stable.
Secession-Free Equilibria
Consider N countries of equal size s. 
For any z · s=2, let u n denote the status-quo utility of an individual located at a distance s=2 ¡ z from the center, that is: 3 3 For instance, when K = 0:5, for g = 800, the critical _ _ pe is 400; for g = 1600, the critical _ _ pe is 700, etc. 3 4 The conditions that characterize the corner solutions are available upon request.
(g; K; pe), we can calculate the minimum N that is secession-free. We calculate the minimum N that is secession-free for di¤erent values of the parameters and …nd that ² N is decreasing in pe.
² The largest integer smaller than r g ¡ pe 2K is always secession free.
